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shall be the same as in the supreme court," CPLR 3212 is made
applicable to the Court of Claims.
In Vern Norton, the state argued that since Rule 13 of the
Rules of the Court of Claims provides that the state is not required
to responsively plead, and since, in fact, no answer had been
served, the requirement of CPLR 3212 that issue be joined before
summary judgment is awarded had not been fulfilled. However,
the court noted that rule 13 also provides that the state is deemed
to deny all the allegations of the claim. Therefore, issue is joined
as required by CPLR 3212, without formal service of responsive
pleadings and the plaintiff may move for summary judgment
immediately after filing his claim. 5
CPLR 3216: 45-day demand inapplicable to dismissal for
general delay.*
It appears that the controversy surrounding the interpretation
of the 1964 amendment to CPLR 3216 ' has been finally settled
by the Court of Appeals. In Thwmas v. Melbert Foods, IIW., 7 0
personal injury was alleged to have occured in October, 1960,
and an action was commenced in June, 1962. The plaintiff failed
- Cf. CPLR 3019(a).
*As this issue of the Survey was going to press, CPLR 3216 was
repealed and replaced with an amended section, which, in part, reads:
"(a) Where a party unreasonably neglects to proceed generally in an
action or otherwise delays . . . or unreasonably fails to serve and file a note
of issue, the ccurt, on its own initiative or upon motion, may dismiss the
party's pleadings on terms. Unless the order specifies otherwise, the dis-
missal is not on the merits.
"(b) No dismissal shall be directed under any portion of subdivision (a)
. . . and no court initiative shall be taken or motion made thereunder
unless the following conditions precedent have been complied with: . . .
(3) The court or party seeking such relief . . . shall have served a
written demand by registered or certified mail requiring the party against
whom such relief is sought to resume prosecution of the action and to serve
and file a notice of issue within forty-five days after receipt of such demand,
and further stating that the default by the party upon whom such notice
is served in complying with such demand within the forty-five day period
will serve as a basis for a motion . . . for unreasonably neglecting to
proceed."
While practical considerations prevent a full treatment of the repeal and
amendment of 3216 in this issue, the next installment of the Survey will
include a thorough discussion of the effect, if any, of this change upon the
practitioner. It is important to note here, however, that the new section
makes service of a written demand a necessary prerequisite both in cases of
failure to proceed and in cases of failure to file a note of issue.
19 See generally 7B McKiNNE,'s CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 210
(1966); Tlw Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JOHN's L.
Rnv. 279, 312 (1966).
70 19 N.Y.2d 216, 225 N.E.2d 534, 278 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1967).
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to submit to a physical examination requested by the defendant
in March, 1963. No further action was taken. Finally, in Feb-
ruary, 1965, without first making a demand for the plaintiff to file
a note of issue, the defendant moved to dismiss for failure to
prosecute. The appellate division, first department71 in accord with
its prior holdings7 2 granted the motion.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the 1964 amendment to
CPLR 3216 required the defendant to serve a forty-five day demand
before moving for dismissal. If the plaintiff then complied by
filing a note of issue, the motion to dismiss must be denied.
It seems that the plaintiff requested too much. The Court had
already ruled in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lafayette Lincoln-
Mercury, Inc.,73 that even if the plaintiff filed a note of issue
within forty-five days of demand, a dismissal could nevertheless
be granted because of the plaintiff's prior general delay. How-
ever, Commercial Credit, when considered with Fischer v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc.74 and Salama v. Cohen,75 had indicated
that the defendant must make the forty-five day demand before
any motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, even for general
delay prior to the filing of the note of issue, could be granted.
The Thonmas Court held that this interpretation would force a
defendant to make a meaningless demand before he could move
for a dismissal on the grounds of general delay. Additional
delay would also be caused by the plaintiff's meaningless compliance
with the demand. The Court, therefore, refused to ascribe to the
legislature the intent to establish such a superfluous procedure.
The majority found that the legislature recognized that the
1964 amendment could not be interpreted as requiring the forty-
five day demand before every 3216 motion. The Court noted
that the vetoed 1965 amendment was passed to specifically require
the demand and, if the plaintiff complied with the demand, that
the motion to dismiss may not be granted. Also, the governor's
veto message had cited the disapproval of the amendment by the
presiding justices of the appellate division of the second, third,
and fourth departments as being "an unnecessary limitation on
the discretion of the courts in dealing with neglected actions. .. .,6
7' Thomas v. Melbert Foods, Inc., 24 App. Div. 2d 714, 263 N.Y.S.2d 442
(lst Dep't 1966).
72 See, e.g., Roberts v. New York Post Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 714, 263
N.Y.S.2d 338 (1st Dep't 1965); Brown v. Weissberg, 22 App. Div. 2d 282,
254 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1st Dep't 1964); Mulinos v. Coliseum Constr. Corp.,
22 App. Div. 2d 163, 254 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1st Dep't 1964).
73 17 N.Y.2d 367, 218 N.E.2d 272, 271 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1966).
74 16 N.Y.2d 725, 209 N.E.2d 725, 262 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1965).
75 16 N.Y.2d 1058, 213 N.E.2d 461, 266 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1965); The
Bianimal Survey of New York Practice, 40 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 303, 340
(1966).
76 1965 N.Y. LEG. ANN. 551.
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The majority believed that its construction preserved a broader
judicial discretion.
The majority, however, made it clear that courts should not
be bound by the defendant's characterization of his motion. Where
the defendant moves to dismiss on grounds of general delay,
a court, considering all the factors, may find that there has,
in fact, been no general delay and that the defendant's only com-
plaint is that the plaintiff has delayed in filing a note of issue.
In such a case, a court could then deny the defendant's motion
and require a compliance with the forty-five day demand pro-
vision of CPLR 3216.
The dissent argued that the intent of the 1964 amendment
was clear; it was passed at the prompting of the plaintiff's bar
to limit the discretionary power to dismiss for failure to prosecute,
and not to provide that the failure to file a note of issue shall be
an additional ground of dismissal. The 1965 amendment was
interpreted as intending to confirm what the dissent felt to be
the clear meaning of the 1964 legislation. The dissent believed
that the majority's position rendered the 1964 amendment "a
supererogatory provision, a meaningless and nugatory act, and
indicates that the Court has usurped the law-making power re-
served to the legislature." 77
It is possible, as the dissent noted, that the majority resorted
to a construction of 3216 which avoided a constitutional issue.
In a lucid dictum in the last paragraph of Commercial Credit,
the Court had stated that it was prepared to hold unconstitu-
tional any interference with the inherent discretionary power of
courts to control their calendars.7 8  While this position has ap-
parently lost the support of the dissenters, no similar language
appears in the Thomas decision. However, the Court noted that
its interpretation of the amendment preserves the "inherent power"
and "the right of courts to dismiss in their discretion for general
failure to prosecute. . .. ,, 70
Although the constitution gives the legislature the power to
"regulate . . . proceedings in law and in equity that it has here-
tofore exercised," S0 there is authority for holding legislation
unconstitutional as infringing upon the inherent power of courts
to control their calendars. In the 1904 case of Riglander v.
77 Thomas v. Melbert Foods, Inc., 19 N.Y2d 216, 227, 225 N.E.2d 534,
539, 278 N.Y.S.2d 836, 843 (1967).
78 Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lafayette Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 17 N.Y.2d
367, 373, 218 N.E.2d 272, 274, 271 N.Y.S.2d 212, 216 (1966).
7 0 Thomas v. Melbert Foods, Inc., supra note 77, at 221, 225 N.E.2d at
536, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 839. (Emphasis added.)
so N.Y. CoNsT. art VI, § 30.
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Star Co.,8 ' the court invalidated a statute making calendar pref-
erences mandatory, 2 stating:
[W]hile the Legislature has the power to alter and regulate the
proceedings in law and equity, it can only exercise such power in
that respect as it has heretofore exercised; and it has never before
attempted to deprive the courts of that judicial discretion which they
have been always accustomed to exercise.
83
If courts have a power to control their calendars, it would seem
they must also have inherent discretionary power to dismiss for
failure to prosecute.
However the constitutional issue may have been decided, the
Court chose not to base its decision thereon. Hopefully, the
uncertainty caused by the 1964 amendment to CPLR 3216 has
been ended so that the constitutional issue need never be decided.
CPLR 3216: Motion based on general delay.
While Thomas v. Melbert Foods, Inc., 4 has established that
a defendant may move for a dismissal for failure to prosecute
without first serving the plaintiff with a forty-five day demand
for filing a note of issue, some questions remain as to the weight
of the factors which are to be considered in deciding a motion
based upon general delay. In Kasiuba v. New York Times Co., 5
the court has emphasized the defendant's contribution to and
acquiescence in the delay.
In Sortino v. Fisher,86 the most exhaustive survey of the
various factors to be considered on a 3216 motion, the court
noted that while there are exceptions, the duty to prosecute lies
primarily with the plaintiff. While the court in Kasiuba agreed,
it stressed that even though no duty is owed to the plaintiff,
the defendant at least owes a duty to the court to press for
dismissal of the action. In Kasiuba the defendant had waited
two months before serving its answer and another fifteen months
8198 App. Div. 101, 90 N.Y. Supp. 772 (1st Dep't 1904), aff'd memn.,
181 N.Y. 531, 73 N.E. 1131 (1905).
82 Code of Civil Procedure § 793, as amended by ch. 173, Laws of N.Y.
1904.
83 Riglander v. Star Co., 98 App. Div. 101, 105, 90 N.Y. Supp. 772, 775
(1st Dep't 1904). See also Plachte v. Bancroft, Inc., 3 App. Div. 2d 437,
433, 161 N.Y.S2d 892, 894 (1st Dep't 1957), wherein the court stated that
"a statute which would impose a mandate upon the court in the otherwise
discretionary handling of time of trial is unconstitutional."
8419 N.Y.2d 216, 225 N.E.2d 534, 278 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1967).
85 51 Misc. 2d 700, 273 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1966).
86 20 App. Div. 2d 25, 245 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1st Dep't 1963); A Biannual
Survey of New York Practice, 38 ST. JOHN's L. Rsv. 406, 448 (1964).
